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CAUGHT IN THE ACT BUT NOT 
PUNISHED: ON ELITE RULE OF LAW 
AND DETERRENCE 
Francesca R. Jensenius and Abby K. Wood 
Most literature on criminal deterrence in law, economics, and criminology assumes that people 
who are caught for a crime will be punished.  The literature focuses on how the size of sanctions 
and probability of being caught affect criminal behavior. However, in many countries entire 
groups of people are “above the law” in the sense that they are able to evade punishment even if 
caught violating the law. In this paper we argue that both the perceived probability of being 
punished if caught and the cultural acceptance of elites evading punishment are important parts 
of theorizing about deterrence, particularly about corruption among political elites. Looking at 
data on parking violations among diplomats in New York City 1997–2002, we explore how 
diplomats from different rule-of-law cultures respond to sudden legal immunity. The empirical 
observations provide clear evidence of both the stickiness and the gradual weakening of cultural 
constraints. 
Keywords: Corruption, rule of law, criminal 
deterrence, political elites, legal enforcement.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Most literature on deterring criminal behavior assumes that 
people who are caught for a crime will be punished. In the classic 
deterrence model, deterrence depends on the expected benefit of the 
criminal act, weighed against the probability of being caught, and the 
size of the sanction if caught. Yet, in many parts of the world, there 
are entire groups of people who are not really subject to the rule of 
law, as they are able to evade punishment even if caught breaking the 
law. Who these groups are, and how large they are, varies from 
country to country. De facto immunity from punishment can run with 
class status, kinship, wealth, ethnicity, or status as a political elite. For 
people who are above the law, no increase in the size of the formal 
sanction for committing a crime or corrupt act, and no increase in 
detection efforts by the government, will alter their propensity to 
engage in criminal or corrupt behavior, because the probability of 
being punished if caught is too low for legal enforcement to affect 
their behavior. 
An important question is how elites respond to de facto 
immunity and to changes in the probability of being punished if caught 
for a criminal act. Such changes may occur more often than we might 
think: Civil wars end and relative power shifts between groups; 
constitutional amendments are passed, resulting in less-favored 
groups being given formal equality; the presidency changes hands and 
with it one family rises while another falls. 
In this paper, we explore data from another such change, 
which is more easily accessible. We use data from a paper by 
Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel to examine the propensity of 
diplomats from across the world to accumulate unpaid parking 
tickets in New York City, where they for several years enjoyed 
diplomatic immunity.1 Dividing diplomats’ countries into four rule-
of-law cultures, we show that there is great variation in the reactions 
of diplomats from different cultures. Elites hailing from cultures 
where it is common to abuse elite privileges were quick to embrace 
the opportunity to do so. Diplomats from countries in which elites 
                                                
1    Raymond Fisman & Edward Miguel, Corruption, Norms, and Legal 
Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1020 (2007). 
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tend to be more accountable were more law-abiding. And 
interestingly, those diplomats from strong rule-of-law cultures who 
started violating in higher numbers over time, did so occasionally 
rather than constantly. These findings suggest that both the perceived 
probability of being punished if caught and the cultural acceptance of 
elites evading punishment are important parts of theorizing about 
deterrence, particularly about corruption among political elites. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II explains a concept 
implicit in general deterrence theory: the perceived probability of 
being punished if caught for a crime, and also discusses the 
importance of ethics and culture in constraining behavior. Here we 
also describe the data from New York that we use to explore how 
political elites from different rule-of-law cultures respond to a zero-
enforcement legal environment. In section III, we explain the 
typology that divides countries into four categories of corruption 
types that we use in our analysis. Section IV presents diplomats’ 
responses, by group, to entering a zero-enforcement environment. 
Section V concludes. 
II.  RULE OF LAW AND ELITE DETERRENCE 
Scholars of law, economics, sociology, and public policy have 
built an extensive literature exploring criminal deterrence in various 
contexts.2 The basic model in the literature theorizes that general 
deterrence from criminal behavior is a function of the probability of 
detection, the size of the sanction, and the benefit that the would-be 
violator stands to gain if not detected. Scholars have focused 
especially on how changes in the perceived or actual probability that a 
                                                
2    See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, 
DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973); Gary S. Becker, 
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); Gary S. 
Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 
3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celebrity, 
Impulsivity, and Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and 
Evidence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 865 (2001); Mitchell A. Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 
Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement, 81 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (2001); Aaron Chalfin & 
Justin McCrary, Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Literature (May 9, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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crime is detected and changes in the size of the formal or informal 
sanction affect levels of deterrence.  Yet, the probability of being 
punished if caught for a criminal act is also a key determinant of how 
people behave, and therefore of the efficiency of deterrence. In a 
review of deterrence literature, Steven N. Durlauf and Daniel S. 
Nagin conclude that there is limited evidence of an effect of the size 
of a sanction in deterring criminal acts, but considerable evidence 
that the certainty of a sanction affects behavior.3 They point out that 
while there is an extensive literature about how this certainty is 
affected by the probability of detection, little is written about the 
probability of being prosecuted and sentenced, that is: the probability 
of being punished if caught. 
It is not an unreasonable simplification to assume that people 
are sanctioned when they are caught for a crime when studying non-
elites, but it is a heroic assumption to make about elites. Across the 
world there is great variation in elite’s propensity of being sentenced 
if caught for a criminal act. In some cases, the law actually mandates 
prosecution with a probability of zero. For example, sitting heads of 
state enjoy de jure immunity from prosecution under international law, 
and the U.S. Department of Justice does not consider a sitting U.S. 
President to be “amenable to prosecution.”4 Nevertheless, de jure 
immunity is a relatively rare phenomenon. Most people in the world 
who are immune from punishment do not enjoy de jure immunity – 
the law does not protect them. Rather, they enjoy de facto immunity. 
De facto immunity covers a broader set of people across the world and 
is based on suspects being able to use bribes, friendships, threats, 
coercion, or other means of pressure in order to avoid, minimize, 
delay, or completely avoid the sanction.5 
                                                
3    Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, Overview of “Imprisonment and 
Crime: Can Both Be Reduced?” 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 9 (2011). 
4    Randolph D. Moss, A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and 
Criminal Prosecution, 24 OP. O.L.C. 222 (2000), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2000/10/31/op-olc-
v024-p0222_0.pdf.  
5    See Brian J. Fried, Paul Lagunes & Atheendar Venkataramani, 
Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and 
Discrimination in Latin America, 45 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 76 (2010); Michael 
Johnston, Corruption, Inequality, and Change, in CORRUPTION, DEVELOPMENT AND 
INEQUALITY: SOFT TOUCH OR HARD GRAFT  13 (Peter M. Ward ed., 1989); Brian 
2016 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:2 
690 
The extent to which elites are able to avoid punishment when 
caught for criminal acts is closely related to corruption. Polinsky and 
Shavell demonstrate the logic of how corruption undermines 
deterrence by making it possible to bribe or extort one’s way out of 
punishment.6 Missing from the discussion is how the ability to evade 
punishment differs based on individual characteristics: we know that 
elites are much more likely to be able to evade punishment than non-
elites. We also know that there is great cultural variation in the 
acceptance of some people being above the law. In some cultural 
contexts, elites can literally get away with murder. 
While many countries could provide examples of elites 
enjoying a high degree of de facto immunity, we offer examples from 
India and Brazil to build intuition. In India’s 2014 elections for the 
543 seats in the Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament), more than 
one third of the candidates faced criminal charges – and more than 
60% of those faced especially serious charges.7 Moreover, Indian 
elites are notorious for using their networks and bribes to make sure 
their criminal cases join the judicial backlog, which is now 30 million 
cases long.8 In Brazil, experimental evidence suggests that, when 
compared to lower-class drivers, upper-class drivers are both less 
likely to be stopped when committing a traffic violation and more 
likely to receive only a warning during traffic stops that do occur.9 
There is great variation in which groups of elites are above 
the law both between countries and within countries – people with a 
                                                
J. Fried, Paul Lagunes & Atheendar Venkataramani, Corruption and Inequality at the 
Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America, 45 LATIN 
AM. RES. REV. 76 (2010); Joel S. Hellman & Daniel Kaufmann, The Inequality of 
Influence (Dec. 2002) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
6    Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 2. 
7    Lok Sabha Elections 2014 Analysis of Criminal Background, Financial, 
Education, Gender and other details of Winners, report by the Association for 
Democratic Reform, May 18, 2014, http://www.adrindia.org/research-and-
report/election-watch/lok-sabha/2014/lok-sabha-2014-winners-analysis-criminal-
and-finan. 
8    Ram Mashru, Justice Delayed is Justice Denied: India’s 30 Million Case 
Judicial Backlog, THE DIPLOMAT, Dec. 25, 2013, 
http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/justice-delayed-is-justice-denied-indias-30-
million-case-judicial-backlog/. 
9    Fried, Lagunes & Venkataramani, supra note 5. 
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high socioeconomic status, from historically advantaged ethnic 
groups, families or castes, or those who hold government positions, 
could all enjoy de facto immunity. Our main point is that for these 
elites, neither the size of the formal sanction for committing a crime 
nor the detection efforts by the government are the main 
determinants of whether they choose to commit a crime. 
1. Culture, Institutions, and Ethics 
Not all those who have an opportunity to go unpunished will 
take advantage of their impunity. Both personal ethics and group-
level culture could serve as constraints. For example, while it is well 
known that some civil servants and politicians in India take kick-
backs, speed money, and bribes, many officials are also proud to say 
that they never do so.10 
Whereas the institutional framework we examine in the 
deterrence literature is usually quite clear, the cultural and ethical 
mechanisms are not only less tidy, but also less explored in political 
science and economics. The line between culture and institutions is 
also quite fuzzy. Many aspects of culture can be thought of as a series 
of informal institutional rules, some of which work to improve 
governance, and some of which work against good governance.11 
Moreover, many sanctions are informal, rather than formal,12 such 
that an elite who takes advantage of her immunity might still be 
ostracized by fellow elites who think that her behavior reflects poorly 
on them as a group. But the concept of informal institutions does not 
capture all of culture, and does not fully explain the mechanism by 
which individuals bring their culture to a new institutional 
                                                
10    See Francesca Refsum Jensenius, Power, Performance and Bias: 
Evaluating the Electoral Quotas for Scheduled Castes in India (2013) (unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with University of 
California, Berkeley) (interviews with politicians and civil servants in Himachal 
Pradesh, Delhi, and Uttar Pradesh in 2010 and 2011). 
11    INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRACY: LESSONS FROM LATIN 
AMERICA 11 (Gretchen Helmke & Steven Levitsky eds., 2006). 
12    FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE 
LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973); Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The 
Deterrent Effect of Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment Revisited, 27 
CRIMINOLOGY  721 (1989). 
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environment, or how culture affects behavior, particularly where 
host-environment and home-environment cultural norms conflict. 
Social psychologists have long studied acculturation, 
emphasizing that a mix of both the person and the situation predicts 
behavior.13 Cultures condition the availability and accessibility of 
different implicit theories that people use to interpret the social 
world. The nature of the situation is comprised, in part, by whether 
there is cultural consensus on what the situation is and what the right 
course of action will be in a given situation.14 For example, cultures 
might vary on interpersonal levels of agreement on whether a certain 
behavior – like a political elite not paying a parking ticket – is 
acceptable for a given person.15 
2. Constraint Decay and Zero-Enforcement Environments 
The data we use in this paper are from a study that examines 
how diplomats in New York City who had enjoyed legal immunity 
responded to a sudden legal crackdown on illegal parking.16 The part 
of the data we focus on is the information about parking violations 
among diplomats in the pre-crackdown zero-enforcement 
environment. Some of these elites neither had de jure nor de facto 
immunity in their home countries. For them, moving to New York 
City therefore meant a change in the probability of being sanctioned 
– providing immunity where none was enjoyed before. For other 
elites, who enjoyed immunity in their home countries, there was little 
change in their relationship to the law when entering a zero-
enforcement environment – they remained above the law. The result 
of the legal crackdown studied by Fisman and Miguel was clear: 
enforcement worked. In this paper we are more interested in further 
                                                
13    Walter Mischel, On the Interface of Cognition and Personality: Beyond the 
Person–Situation Debate, 34 AM. PSYCHOL.OGIST 740 (1979). 
14    Shane T. Mueller & Elizabeth S. Veinott, Cultural Mixture Modeling: A 
Method for Identifying Cultural Consensus, 4 ARA TECH. REV. 39 (2008). 
15    See generally Ying-yi Ho Hong & Desiree YeeLing Phua, In Search of 
Culture’s Role in Influencing Individual Social Behaviour, 16 ASIAN  J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 26 
(2013) (providing a brief review of the literature). 
16    Fisman & Miguel, supra note 1. 
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exploring the variation in the behavior of the diplomats from 
different legal cultures in the zero-enforcement environment. 
A rational choice analysis of a zero-enforcement environment 
would predict that, on average, elites would violate the law often, or 
at least as often as the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs, 
showing at least a partial convergence on a high-violation 
equilibrium. A theory of cultural constraints would predict that elites 
in a zero-enforcement environment would continue to follow the 
norms to which they were accustomed. 
But we might imagine that there is a “constraint decay” that 
could happen over time, as those who initially are constrained by 
culture enter a new environment in which the previously stigmatized 
behavior is not stigmatized. This happens regularly in the non-
criminal context, as people move from more conservative cultures 
spheres to more liberal cultures spheres. It happens in the criminal 
context, too, as people travel between jurisdictions that criminalize 
certain behaviors (say, possession of marijuana, or consuming alcohol 
below a certain age) and those that do not. And finally, it can happen 
as elites gain or lose de facto legal immunity. 
Our idea of “constraint decay” is similar in nature to what 
Nagin refers to as “stigma erosion,” but it is on the opposite end of 
the enforcement spectrum.17  Stigma erosion is the gradual decline in 
the stigma associated with a behavior after an enforcement change 
occurs and behavior becomes newly stigmatized. Here, we examine a 
context in which the constraint comes from the culture or 
institutions of a previous environment, and we explore whether those 
constraints decay over time in a zero-enforcement environment. 
There a several ways in which constraint decay could occur. 
One is through personal experience, or what is increasingly discussed 
as Bayesian updating.18 As a person acts with impunity in a way that 
would constitute a violation under the prior regime, the prior 
                                                
17    Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-
First Century, 23 CRIME AND JUST. 1, 23 (1998). 
18    See Shamena Anwar & Thomas A. Loughran, Testing a Bayesian 
Learning Theory of Deterrence Among Serious Juvenile Offenders, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 667 
(2011). 
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constraint will slowly erode. In some conservative cultures, members 
of the opposite sex are to avoid physical contact, including shaking 
hands. In a culture in which no such constraint exists, people from 
the conservative cultures might start to shake hands with members of 
the opposite sex in order to facilitate other goals (such as business 
opportunities or social integration), and the hesitation to offer one’s 
hand will decrease with each new handshake that occurs without 
social sanction. Or, in the wake of the legalization of possession of 
small amounts of marijuana by the City of Denver, Colorado, 
someone might smoke marijuana openly in their front yards and 
experience no sanction from a nearby police officer. Each time that 
happens, they learn that there really is no sanction for possessing and 
consuming small amounts of marijuana in that jurisdiction. 
Similarly, in an enforcement environment in which political 
elites enjoy immunity from parking tickets, elites that are accustomed 
to having to pay parking tickets in their home environment could 
shed their hesitation from parking illegally over time, as their number 
of unpaid parking tickets accumulated without sanction. 
Another pathway by which constraint decay could occur is via 
the observation of the experiences of others. With the handshake 
example, people from conservative cultures would observe 
handshakes between men and women without any social disapproval 
shown. They do not have to actually take the “risk” of shaking hands 
with someone of the opposite sex to learn that no social sanction 
exists. Similarly, when it comes to elites, we can imagine them 
changing their behavior solely based on the experiences of others 
who have been in the new legal environment for a longer time.19 
                                                
19    Constraint decay should happen faster for people who have fewer, or 
less intense, ties to the home culture upon arrival in the new environment so that 
the cultural norms of the home culture are not being consistently refreshed. For 
example, a 20 year old college student from the United States (where the drinking 
age is 21), who goes to Mexico on a church-related mission project with several 
other members of the home church, is much less likely to drink alcohol while in 
Mexico (where the drinking age is 18), than if she traveled to Mexico alone for a 
study abroad program. The number and intensity of cultural ties among the elite 
diplomats we study is impossible for us to observe with our data, so we leave this 
hypothesis for others to test. 
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Our notion of constraint decay can serve to reconcile the 
predictions of rational choice theory and a theory of fixed cultural 
constraints. If constraint decay drives behavior of elites in a zero-
enforcement environment, then we should see a gradual increase in 
violations among people from different rule-of-law-cultures over 
time, but also a persistence in cultural differences. We might observe 
it happen via the experience pathway, such that each ticket predicts 
that the next ticket will happen with a shorter delay.  And we might 
simply observe it happen over time, regardless of the number of 
tickets accumulated, which is consistent with the informal contacts 
pathway. 
III.  DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
The variation in the legal enforcement of unpaid parking 
violations for diplomats in New York City provides an excellent 
opportunity to explore what happens to elites from different rule-of-
law cultures in a zero-enforcement environment. Due to the legal 
immunity of diplomatic personnel, the City of New York experienced 
enormous amounts of illegal parking and unpaid parking tickets by 
diplomats in the city. Illegal parking presented particular challenges 
when the illegally parked diplomatic cars blocked fire hydrants and 
access to handicapped parking spots, in addition to blocking traffic 
by double-parking. The police would issue parking tickets every time 
they found an illegally parked car from a diplomatic mission,20 but if 
the mission did not voluntarily pay the ticket, the police had no 
further way of sanctioning the parking violations, since diplomats 
could not be taken to court for failing to pay the ticket. As of 2002, 
UN diplomats owed the City $18 million because of the 150,000 
unpaid parking tickets that they had accrued.21 
                                                
20    As we explain below, the vast majority of diplomats had no unpaid 
tickets over the time period, and we can assume, given the difficulties of parking in 
New York City, that many did receive parking tickets over the same time period 
and paid them. Hence, ticketing cars with diplomatic plates was a rational strategy 
for the NYC parking enforcers. 
21    Fisman & Miguel, supra note 1, at 1024. 
2016 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:2 
696 
When it came to parking, diplomats from across the world 
who came to New York City found themselves in a legal 
environment where they were above the law. To limit the extensive 
abuse of illegal parking, the City of New York enforced a legal 
crackdown on diplomatic parking violations in October 2002. The 
particular form of the enforcement was not to issue more tickets, but 
instead to revoke diplomatic license plates on diplomatic cars that 
had accumulated three or more parking violations that went unpaid 
more than 100 days. 
Using a dataset of month-wise unpaid parking violations for 
diplomats in New York City, Fisman and Miguel showed a strong 
correlation between the score on a commonly-used, unidimensional 
country-level corruption index and the propensity for diplomats from 
that country to park illegally in this zero-enforcement environment.22 
They also analyzed individual-level data and demonstrated that the 
number of unpaid violations per month increased with tenure in New 
York City. While the emphasis in their article is on the impressive 
effect of enforcement after 2002 – when the New York police started 
towing cars that had an unpaid parking ticket – it is also an excellent 
empirical example of what Durlauf and Nagin describe as a sudden 
change in the certainty of punishment. The data are interesting because 
they provide a unique insight into petty violations among elites from 
across the world, rather than the more commonly studied college 
students and non-elite criminals.23 Finally, it provides evidence of 
what happens when individuals from various contexts encounter a 
situation where it is common and fairly acceptable to commit an 
infraction. 
                                                
22    Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance 
Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004 WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH, 
(May 2005), http://go.worldbank.org/2GF3HGVDO0. (The “Kaufmann” 
corruption index is one of the most common unidimensional ways to analyze 
corruption. It is based on the work of Daniel Kaufmann and coauthors. Kaufmann 
was Director of the World Bank Institute when the score was developed).Daniel 
Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters IV: Governance 
Indicators for 1996-2004 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper, May 2005), 
http://go.worldbank.org/2GF3HGVDO0.  
23    Durlauf & Nagin, supra note 3, at 16. 
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In this paper, we use data from the pre-enforcement time 
period to gain insight into what happens when political elites from 
different cultures arrive in a zero-enforcement regime. The data 
include the monthly number of parking violations for 1,995 
diplomats present in New York for some or all of the time December 
1997 until October 2002 – adding up to a total of 17,972 violations 
or an average of about 1 violation per diplomat per month across 
these years. 
1. Rule-of-Law Cultures 
Fisman and Miguel found that the overall corruption score of 
a country was strongly correlated with unpaid parking violations, but 
why was this the case? Why should the overall level of corruption in a 
society result in diplomats feeling comfortable breaking the law while 
abroad?  Why should the habit of business elites in a country paying 
their way to contracts, or bureaucrats extorting grease payments for 
provision of simple services, or police extorting the citizenry, predict 
these elites feeling comfortable parking illegally and not paying for 
the parking ticket afterwards?  We posit that it is not the level of 
corruption in the country per se, but rather the rule-of-law culture and 
the extent to which elites are used to (and comfortable with) being 
above the law that predicts their behavior. 
Measuring the cultural background of diplomats and their 
perceived probability of being punished for a crime is not an easy 
task. Corruption measures incorporate much more than the rule of 
law, and rule of law measures incorporate much more than just the 
“thin” concept of whether the government is subject to the law. A 
growing literature calls into question the usefulness of existing 
measures of the rule of law itself finding that they are both under- 
and over-inclusive for measuring both “thick” and “thin” concepts of 
the rule of law.24 General measures of the average rule of law in a 
                                                
24    See generally THOMAS CAROTHERS, PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW 
ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE (Thomas Carothers ed. 2006); Gillian K. 
Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, Microfoundations of the Rule of Law, 17 ANN. REV. POL. 
SCI. 21 (2013); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Matthew D. McCubbins & Barry R. Weingast, 
The Rule of Law Unplugged, 59 EMORY L.J. 1455 (2009); Melissa A. Thomas, What Do 
2016 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:2 
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country do not capture the perceived probability of being punished 
for the elite in a country. Our ideal measure might take into account 
perceptions of whether the law governs the governors and whether 
the judiciary is independent from other branches of government. It 
would be less concerned with other aspects of existing measures, like 
civil rights protection.25 
To approximate the concept we are interested in, we turn to 
an interesting effort to measure corruption that emphasizes the role 
and importance of elites specifically. Michael Johnston proposed four 
“Syndromes of Corruption,” or clusters of country corruption in 
multidimensional space.26 His four clusters present an intuitive, 
facially valid, description of elite subjection to the rule of law – 
indeed, his conception of corruption, on which his clusters are based, 
is “uses of and connections between wealth and power that 
significantly weaken open, competitive participation and economic 
and political institutions, or delay or prevent their development”, in 
other words, elites’ uses of their elite status in ways that, even if not 
illegal, undermine the country’s institutional frameworks.27 
In creating the four syndromes, Johnston conducted a cluster 
analysis on data for 97 countries. He used the Polity score to measure 
the level of democracy in 1992 and 2002, the World Economic 
Forum’s 2002 score for institutional and social capacity, the Heritage 
Foundation’s 2002 measure of property rights, and the Economic 
Freedom in the World ranking from the Fraser Institute from 1990 
                                                
the Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure, 22 EUR. J. DEV. RES. 31 (2010); Svend-
Erik Skaaning, Measuring the Rule of Law, 63 POL. RES. Q. 449 (2010).   
25    In recent years the World Justice Projects has made great gains in 
creating such a measure. However, these measures are not available for the time 
period of the parking data we use. 
26    MICHAEL JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION: WEALTH, 
POWER, AND DEMOCRACY, 3 (2005); See also Mark David Agrast, et al., Rule of Law 
Index 2011, WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT 2011, 
http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/WJP_Rule_of_Law_Index_2011
_Report.pdf  (A more recent measure which could be used to operationalize elite 
law abidingness now exists: the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index, which 
measures rule of law according to multiple dimensions, one of which is the 
likelihood that elites are punished). 
27    Johnston, supra note 27, at 12.  
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and 2001.28 Democratic development and institutional and social 
capacity would all tend to improve the rule of law, moreover, 
impressions of elite legal compliance probably inform the measures 
that are survey based. Using data from 1992 and 2002 allowed 
Johnston to measure rates of change in these countries, as some of 
the countries democratized and liberalized after their transitions from 
communism and authoritarianism. Based on these data, Johnston 
identified four groups of countries, which he described as Influence 
Markets, Elite Cartels, Oligarchs and Clans, and Official Moguls.29 
Importantly, the groups of countries cut across region, and one of 
their most important distinctions is the status and power of elites in 
each country. 
Influence Markets (IMs) are eighteen countries that have a 
generally high level of human development, are established 
democracies, and have a strong rule of law. Leaders face competition 
and are constrained from acting arbitrarily, economies are free, and 
society is generally able to focus on quality of life, rather than 
survival. These countries are called Influence Markets because the 
rich generally have access to and influence on power, but the 
institutionalization of the state does not allow corruption to violate 
the established institutions. In Johnston’s words, “often politicians 
serve as middlemen, putting their connections out for rent in 
exchange for contributions both legal and otherwise.”30 Influence 
markets include Japan, Austria, Uruguay, Finland, Germany, and 
Costa Rica, among others. In terms of our discussion, elites’ 
perceived probability of being punished if caught in Influence 
Markets countries probably does not vary much across individuals, 
and is close to one for almost all people. 
Elite Cartels (ECs), which include Argentina, Belgium, 
Botswana, Greece, Israel, and South Korea, among others, are less 
                                                
28    For more information about Johnston’s methodology, see his 
description in Johnston, supra note 27. Our efforts to re-cluster his data by 
systematically dropping one indicator at a time have resulted in poorer separation 
between clusters. 
29    See infra p. 33 Appendix A (providing a full list of the countries, the 
rule-of-law cultures to which they pertain, and the distance from the statistical 
center of the cluster identified by Johnston’s ANOVA). 
30    Johnston, supra note 27, at 42.  
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tightly clustered in Johnston’s data, but do share plenty of 
commonalities. Namely, “the rules of the game” are less certain in 
these twenty-one countries. Elites inside and outside of government 
are less constrained by the rule of law, and “relatively established 
elites collude within a moderately strong institutional framework.”31 
The citizens of these countries are “relatively affluent,” and their 
markets are relatively stable and open. However, institutionalization 
of government is less well-developed or less-well controlled than in 
the IM countries. Because of rapid industrialization or 
democratization, elites in these countries find alliances across sector 
lines and across the public/private sector divide. Black markets are 
more prominent in Elite Cartels than in Influence Markets. In terms 
of our discussion, we might expect the probability of being punished 
to have a higher variance in ECs than in IMs but to still be fairly 
close to one for most people. South Korea is a typical example: the 
“rules of the game” are not as predictable as in IM countries, yet two 
sons of two different South Korean presidents recently served time 
in prison for corruption.32 
Oligarchs and Clans (OCs) comprise thirty countries, 
including Albania, Bangladesh, Colombia, Ghana, India, Nepal, 
Turkey, Russia, and the Philippines. Oligarchs and Clans countries 
have reformed politics and economics to a degree, but their 
institutionalization has not caught up with their success in those 
areas. Rule of law is uncertain in Oligarchs and Clans countries. As a 
result of under-institutionalization, political elites will be “ill-equipped 
to resist [. . .] abuses.”33 Political and civil rights are not always 
guaranteed as a result. Security is low, which results in capital flight, 
and political regimes are unstable. Regulation is “extensive and of 
dubious quality”, and black markets are extensive.34 People are 
generally poor in these countries, and primary exports are relied upon 
heavily. In the case of our example, the perceived probabilities of 
                                                
31    Id. at 45. 
32    See Caroline Gluck, S. Korean President’s Son Jailed, BBC NEWS WORLD 
EDITION (Nov. 1, 2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2384707.stm; 
Nicholas D. Kristof, Seoul’s Mighty, Once Immune, Now Feel the Arm of the Law, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 14, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/14/world/seoul-s-
mighty-once-immune-now-feel-the-arm-of-the-law.html.  
33    Johnston, supra note 27, at 45.  
34    Id. at 57. 
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punishment for elites in OC countries will vary according to the 
would-be offender’s connections to the Oligarchy or Clan that is in 
power. Diplomats at the UN Headquarters are likely to be well-
connected to the elite and their home-country expectation of 
punishment is therefore likely to be low. 
The twenty-nine Official Mogul countries (OMs) are similar 
to Oligarchs and Clans countries in that they are riddled with black 
markets and poverty with ineffective governance and corruption 
controls. However, in these countries, political elites are not 
accountable to the people and are therefore effectively immune from 
accountability. “[P]olitical power is personal, and is often used with 
impunity.”35 Of all the groups, Official Mogul countries offer the 
least protection of civil and political rights. They are also heavily 
dependent on primary exports, and foreign aid that enters the 
country can easily be skimmed off by elites. These countries include 
countries like Chad, China, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Kuwait, 
Morocco, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe. In terms of our model, it is clear 
that the perceived probability of being punished for a crime for 
members of the elite is close to zero. Elites from these countries are 
therefore likely to be used to being above the law and feel quite 
comfortable with this state of affairs. 
When we divide the data for New York diplomats between 
December 1997 and October 2002 according to the four rule-of-law 
cultures, the data includes 516 diplomats from 17 IM countries, 427 
diplomats from 21 EC countries, 566 diplomats from 29 OC 
countries and 485 diplomats from 27 OM countries.36 
                                                
35    Id. at 46.  
36    Dividing the data into rule-of-law cultures reduces the amount of 
information analyzed, because whereas the original parking tickets data included 
151 countries, Johnston only has complete data on 95 of those countries. Most of 
the countries that are omitted are small, but there are some exceptions such as 
Israel and Saudi Arabia that we would like to be able to analyze but cannot for lack 
of data. Overall, the patterns in the data do not change much in this reduced form. 
Johnston’s sample has a mean corruption level of -0.19, which is slightly less 
corrupt (around four percent less corrupt) than the parking ticket data’s mean of -
0.009. This is a tiny difference in the data – it is 0.2 standard deviations on the 
corruption indicator, and in the original dataset, there are only a few countries 
between the original mean (-0.009) and the new mean (-0.19). In the Appendix we 
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In the following sections we use these data to explore or ideas 
about rule-of-law cultures and constraint decay.   
Our first hypothesis is that because of the varying levels of 
elite subjection to the rule of law among the four rule-of-law cultures, 
on average, 𝑉!" < 𝑉!" < 𝑉!" < 𝑉!" , where 𝑉 is the mean number 
of violations per diplomat per month, and the subscripts define the 
group of countries. In other words, there should be a clear difference 
in the behavior of diplomats from different cultures. 
Our second hypothesis is about changes in diplomat behavior 
over time. According to a Rational Choice perspective we should 
expect to see that as diplomats’ time in New York increases, the 
importance of the rule-of-law culture of origin rapidly disappear, such 
that 𝑉!" = 𝑉!" = 𝑉!" = 𝑉!" . A culturalist explanation would, on 
the other hand, would predict little change in behavior over time. 
Based on our discussion we would rather expect to see cultural 
differences persist (𝑉!" < 𝑉!" < 𝑉!" < 𝑉!") but weaken as the 
diplomats’ home-country cultural constraints fade over time. 
IV.  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
In this section we will look at overall patterns, patterns over 
time, and individual-level patterns in parking violations based on the 
four rule-of-law cultures introduced in the previous section. We 
begin our analysis by calculating the average number of parking 
violations per diplomat per month, by group, as illustrated in Figure 
1. 
As is clear in Figure 1, there was considerable variation in the 
average monthly number of violations across diplomats from 
countries with different rule-of-law cultures for the period 1997–
2002. The differences in means between the four groups are reported 
in Table 1. A series of two-sample permutation tests comparing the 
differences in average monthly violations per diplomat between the 
different groups of countries indicate that there are clear differences 
in the behavior of diplomats from different cultures. In particular it 
                                                
should the full list of countries in each group, how the groups related to the 
Kaufman corruption score and also how it relates to Rule of Law measures. 
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should be noted that the OC and OM countries (which have very 
similar scores on corruption indices) differ significantly from each 
other.37 
Figure 1: Average number of parking violations per diplomat 
per month, by group (1997-2002) 
 
  
                                                
37    We include in the appendix a box plot of both corruption indicators 
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          Table 1: Mean violations per diplomat per month (1997-     









Note: The comparison is between the group of countries on the 
reporting line and the one listed above it. Data is individual-level 
diplomat data on monthly violations aggregated to the country 
group. P-values are from two-sample permutation tests with 
10,000 permutations, using the perm.test() package in R. 
 
But did all the diplomats start violating the law in this zero-
enforcement environment?  Table 2 shows the data for the diplomats 
present in NYC between December 1997 and 2002.  We present 
diplomats’ average number of violations per month during the whole 
time they were in the city. In this case the sample size given is for 
diplomats, not diplomat-months. 
 
We can see that among the diplomats from IM countries about 
92% never accumulated unpaid parking tickets even once during their 
stay in New York; about 7% let tickets go unpaid on average between 
0 and 1 times per month and four diplomats had an average of more 
than one unpaid violation per month. 
 
Table 2: Percentages of diplomats with different average 
numbers of violations per month 
 
Average monthly IM EC OC OM 
violations (N=516) (N=427) (N=566) (N=485) 
 0 92.4 77.3 79.5 61.2 
(0,1] 6.8 17.1 11.8 21.6 
(1,3] 0.8 4.0 4.4 11.6 
(3,5] 0.0 0.5 2.7 2.7 
>5 0.0 1.2 1.6 2.9 
 
 Mean by 
group 
Difference P-value 
 IM 0.14 – – 
EC 0.70 0.56 <0.01 
OC 1.06 0.36 <0.01 
OM 1.91 0.85 <0.01 
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Interestingly, there is a major jump from the behavior of 
diplomats from IM countries to EC countries. In the case of EC 
countries, about 77% of the diplomats always paid their tickets, while 
the rest failed to pay, at least occasionally. The trend we see is that 
many of the diplomats from EC countries seemed to have adapted to 
the new cultural environment by violating a bit, while few of them 
were extreme violators. Among the diplomats from OC countries, on 
the other hand, about 79.5% never violated, but there were a few 
extreme violators that pulled up the average for the rest. 
 
Looking finally at the diplomats from the OM countries, the 
difference is striking: Among the diplomats from the OM countries 
about 39% failed to pay parking tickets during their time in New 
York City, and several of the diplomats failed to pay more than five 
tickets every single month. Coming from a culture where they were 
used to being above the law, and being placed in a zero-enforcement 
environment, the diplomats from OM countries seem to have felt the 
least compelled to follow parking regulations by paying their parking 
tickets, or, put another way, the most willing to take advantage of 
their immunity. 
 
This provides empirical support in favor of our first hypothesis: 
there is a clear rank-ordering in both the number of violations and 
the number of diplomats choosing to violate. 
 
We now turn to our hypotheses about convergence and cultural 
constraints over time. In Figure 2 we look at the average monthly 
number of violations for diplomats broken down by how long they 
had been in New York. If diplomats behave purely rationally, then 
we should observe them adapting quickly to the zero-enforcement 
environment.  Whatever their number of violations in the early days, 
we should see a convergence at a relatively high level of violations 
across groups. If diplomats behave purely according to their home 
country cultures, we should see stable cultural differences in the 
number of violations, which persist over time. However, if constraint 
decay occurs, then we should see cultural differences at the outset, 









Figure 2: Average number of violations over time, by rule-of-law 
culture 
 
As we show in Figure 2, cultural constraints appear to be present, 
but they also seem to decay over time.  Interestingly, few of the new 
diplomats accumulated unpaid tickets during their first three months 
in the city. As expected, the diplomats from OC and OM countries 
were quicker to start taking advantage of the zero-enforcement 
environment, increasing violations after only three months in New 
York City. The diplomats from IM and EC countries seem to have 
been more constrained by their cultures, although these constraints 
gradually seemed to have weakened over time, with violations 
accumulating after 6-12. 38  We view the gradual increase in unpaid 
parking tickets in IM and EC countries as evidence of considerable 
                                                
38    The separation is much clearer than if we run the simple quantiles of 
the corruption index, implying that the typology of rule-of-law cultures gives more 
explanatory power than the corruption score. Also, in this picture the difference in 
the number of violations in OM and OC countries does not look as stark as in in 
the previous table. The reason is that more of the diplomats from the OM 
countries had stayed in NYC for more than one year. Their overall average was 
therefore pulled up by all the frequent violators who had lived in the city for a long 
time. We break down the length of diplomatic stay by rule-of-law culture in the 
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constraint decay: the cultural view that it is ethically wrong to take 
advantage of one’s elite status dissipated when enough of others in 
this new environment violated on a regular basis. At the same time, 
Table 2 reminds us that less than 1% of all IM diplomats 
accumulated more than one unpaid ticket per month on average. 
Substantial cultural constraints remained. 
 
Data on repeat violators helps to complete the picture. We 
reduce the data to only the sub-sample of violators who left more 
than one ticket unpaid during the time in New York. Among these 
repeat violators, the average number of violations the first month they 
violated at all was less than 1.5 for IM and EC diplomats. For OC and 
OM diplomats it was 2.25 and 2.34, respectively, and these numbers 
increased to 3.33 and 2.89 in the second month. Repeat violations 
among diplomats from IM and EC countries held more or less steady 
in their second month. Looking at how fast diplomats started to 
violate, 20% of repeat violators from IM counties accumulated at 
least one parking ticket during their first month in the city, a number 
that was closer to 30% for the diplomats from EC, OC and OM 
countries. On average, repeat violators received their first ticket after 
they had spent about three months in the city, with the exception of 
diplomats from OM countries, who got their first ticket after less 
than two months in the city. Diplomats from IM countries were the 
slowest to repeat violations, and diplomats from OC and OM 
countries were the fastest.  We summarize these results in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Violation Behavior Among Repeat Violators 
 IM EC OC OM 
 (N=34) (N=79) (N=88) (N=146) 
Percent of Diplomats 
who were Repeat 
Violators 
21.21 29.11 28.41 30.82 
Average Month of 
First Violation 
3.03 3.38 3.5 1.80 
Average Number of 
Violations, First 
Month Violating 
1.15 1.49 2.25 2.34 
Average Number of 
Violations, Second 
Month Violating 
1.14 1.57 3.33 2.89 
Average Number of 
Months between First 
and Second Violation 
8.10 5.81 4.27 3.49 
Average Number of 
Months between 
Second and Third 
Violations 
5.15 3.32 2.41 2.81 
     
Based on our theoretical discussion we believe that for OC and 
OM diplomats, a home-country cultural background that views them 
as largely above-the-law increased their readiness to “hit the ground 
violating”, when compared to diplomats from IM, and to perhaps a 
lesser degree, EC cultures. 
 
The data we have presented in the previous sections reveal 
several interesting patterns. First, we can to a large extent predict the 
behavior of diplomats based on their rule-of-law culture. Diplomats 
from OM and OC cultures were less likely to have entered New York 
with any constraints on their immunity, and they were quick to start 
violating the law.  They also responded with frequent violations. 
Second, even for diplomats from IM and EC countries, the 
propensity to break the law increased over time, suggesting that their 
cultural constrains decayed over time. 
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Even so, it is important to note that most diplomats actually 
complied with the law. Even in a zero-enforcement environment, 
most diplomats paid their parking tickets, and among those who did 
violate, most violated only once.  In light of zero-enforcement and 
constraint decay, a large proportion of diplomats seem to have seen it 
as legitimate to violate occasionally, but not constantly. 
 
Together these findings point to interesting interactions between 
rule-of-law cultures and institutional constraints. Members of a 
society might vary in their probability of sanction even if caught red-
handed, and deterrence might function quite differently for elites 
than for others. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Rule-of-law cultures and the social status of the actors 
involved are both important and under-theorized considerations of 
corruption deterrence. While deterrence is often thought of in terms 
of the probability of detection and the size of the sanction, the 
probability of punishment conditional on being caught is a missing 
piece of the theory, and one that we hope to have illuminated in this 
paper. This is particularly important in the case of elites, as there are 
many groups and individuals across the world that may go 
unpunished even in countries with otherwise well-functioning legal 
systems. 
When diplomats from across the world found themselves to be 
effectively immune from punishment for parking illegally, diplomats 
from some countries – namely those where elites are accustomed to 
being able to evade punishment for criminal acts – took advantage of 
the zero-enforcement environment. While existing theories of 
deterrence would predict that all diplomats would abuse this rule to 
the same extent, or that culture would dominate and levels of 
violations would remain unchanged, we see instead that the 
diplomats from countries in which elites tend to be more accountable 
were more law-abiding. Some diplomats from strong rule-of-law 
cultures also started violating in higher numbers over time, as their 
cultural constraints decayed. 
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Our study has focused on a rarified example – that of political 
elites from all over the world living in a zero-enforcement 
environment – but it joins other cross-cultural socioeconomic studies 
that find cultural differences in economic behavior.39 Future research 
on the mechanisms underlying the differences in behavior between 
elites and non-elites would deepen our understanding about how 
people behave in new institutional settings. 
                                                
39    See, e.g., Joseph Henrich, et al., Economic Man in Cross-Cultural 
Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 28 BEHAV. AND BRAIN 
SCIENCES 795 (2005).  
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A. APPENDIX: RULE-OF-LAW CULTURES 
Table A.1: Influence Markets 




1 New Zealand 0.91 
2  Germany 2.32 
3  Switzerland 13.65 
4  Netherlands 3.87 
5  Sweden 8.76 
6  Ireland 8.30 
7  Austria 3.60 
8  Australia 7.28 
9  UK 1.29 
10  Costa Rica 3.84 
11  Denmark 3.65 
12 Canada 2.78 
13  USA* 3.86 
14  Uruguay 9.90 
15  France 9.24 
16  Finland 8.24 
17  Norway 7.66 
18  Japan 2.92 
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Table A.2: Elite Cartels 




1 Czech Rep 2.49 
2  Slovak Rep 2.31 
3  Greece 9.01 
4  Chile 2.34 
5  Paraguay 4.65 
6  Panama 5.72 
7  South Africa 5.52 
8  Spain 7.39 
9  Israel 6.88 
10  Italy 2.98 
11  Hungary 5.75 
12 Namibia 4.57 
13  Korea South 3.22 
14  Portugal 2.63 
15  Botswana 3.64 
16  Belgium 9.07 
17  Poland 3.75 
18  Bolivia 8.03 
19 Zambia 10.62 
20 Brazil 5.54 
21 Argentina 5.72 
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Table A.3: Oligarchs & Clans 




1 Sri Lanka 9.49 
2  Malaysia 7.20 
3  Mexico 7.10 
4  Malawi 2.48 
5  Russia 12.69 
6  Peru 11.62 
7  Pakistan 14.73 
8  Romania 4.25 
9  Philippines 4.14 
10  Nicaragua 2.86 
11  Nepal 3.08 
12 Senegal 7.90 
13  Niger 9.07 
14  El Salvador 2.31 
15  Ecuador 3.99 
16 Benin 1.64 
17  Guatemala 3.63 
18  Ghana 6.99 
19 Turkey 3.24 
20 Bangladesh 9.41 
21 Albania 8.67 
22 Colombia 4.81 
23 Venezuela 8.28 
24 India 3.72 
25 Thailand 7.53 
26 Madagascar 6.79 
27 Jamaica 9.04 
28 Trinidad & Tobago 8.89 
29 Bulgaria 3.69 
30 Honduras 2.99 
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Table A.4: Official Moguls 




1 Tunisia 2.36 
2  Syria 12.33 
3  Zimbabwe 8.38 
4  Uganda 13.63 
5  Togo 3.96 
6  United Arab Emirates 7.44 
7  Tanzania 5.66 
8 Rwanda 2.94 
9  Gabon 5.50 
10  Egypt 5.58 
11  Central Africa Republic 10.60 
12 Indonesia 9.59 
13  Haiti 2.54 
14  Guinea-Bissau 7.93 
15  Cameroon 2.82 
16 Algeria 5.87 
17  Congo Rep of 11.17 
18  China 6.12 
19 Morocco 7.79 
20 Malawi 13.85 
21 Kuwait 5.56 
22 Oman 8.63 
23 Nigeria 10.03 
24 Ivory Coast 7.20 
25 Iran 11.66 
26 Chad 2.94 
27 Myanmar 11.53 
28 Jordan 13.77 
29 Kenya 2.11 
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B. COMPARING RULE-OF-LAW CULTURES AND THE CORRUPTION 
INDEX 
Figure B.1: Level of corruption among the countries belonging 
to countries in each of the rule-of-law cultures 
 
How do the rule-of-law cultures relate to the Kaufman 
corruption index used by Fisman and Miguel?  Figure B.1 shows 
corruption levels by rule-of-law culture. As can be seen in Figure B.1, 
the Influence Markets’ mean level of corruption is much lower than 
for the other groups, the mean level for the Elite Cartels is slightly 
higher, while the Official Moguls and Oligarchs and Clans have a 
similar and high level of corruption. While the Oligarchs and Clans 
and Official Moguls have a fairly low variance on the corruption 
index (0.12 and 0.29, respectively), Influence Markets and Elite 
Cartels have a much higher variance of corruption levels, 0.44 and 
0.51, respectively. Since the Official Moguls and Oligarchs and Clans 
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indicator would predict a similar level of parking violations by 
diplomats from the countries from these rule-of-law cultures. 
However, as we observe in the analysis in the main text, diplomats 
from the two groups of high-corruption countries behave differently, 
lending credence to the idea that rule of law is not adequately 
captured by corruption measures. 
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C. RULE OF LAW INDEX AND RULE-OF-LAW CULTURES 
We do not pursue a strategy involving a new rule of law typology 
here because of the under-conceptualization and difficult 
operationalization of rule of law over the time period. Specifically, we 
lack quality data underlying the 2002 Rule of Law indicator measure 
from the World Bank Institute, but even if it existed, is it largely built 
on overlapping indices that do not separate nicely into clusters for 
analysis. Instead, we show here that the rule-of-law cultures overlap 
with the 2002 rule of law indicator in a very similar way as we saw in 
Figure B.1, though the pattern is more muted. 
 
Figure C.1: Syndromes by Rule of Law Measure 
 
We believe that future scholars will be able to better approximate 
rule of law measures – both “thick” and “thin” concepts. The World 
Justice Project has already made great gains. Its data, unfortunately, 
does not overlap with the time period under analysis here. 
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